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Abstract: 
Assessors are required, as mandated by the Kentucky State Constitution and KRS 
132.690, to assess property at 100 percent of fair market value.  Fair market value is 
defined as the price a seller would expect to receive in an open and competitive 
market.  Evidence from data and analysis in this paper indicates that property is 
under-assessed by approximately 25 percent.  Though urban areas assess at a 
slightly higher rate, this is offset by rural areas, which do a significantly poorer job.  
This has important implications for local communities in Kentucky that depend on 
property tax revenue in order to provide necessary goods and services to residents 
of those communities.  Further, inaccurate property assessments distort the current 
school funding formula used in Kentucky that provides state funding to schools 
based on the value of properties in each school district. 
  
Multiple econometric tests, including a rational expectation test and a hedonic price 
model, are conducted to analyze the quality of PVA assessments for 199 homes 
throughout Kentucky.  These assessments are compared to certified appraisals for 
each home, which also contain market data for 3 comparable properties.  The use of 
these appraisals as a proxy for fair market value is validated by econometric 
analyses that show the appraised value is an unbiased estimate of the market price 
of property and that appraised value is subject to only a small measurement error, 
about 3.5 percent of the variance across all property values.  Further, evidence 
suggests that assessed values appear to be a scaled version of the unbiased appraised 
values.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
Introduction: 
Property taxes support communities in many ways.  The collection of these taxes 
is a necessary condition for a community to provide goods and services to its residents.  
In order for property taxes to be collected, property must first be assessed; local 
governments have given this assessment responsibility to the Property Valuation 
Administrator.  The PVA, an elected official in almost all communities across the 
country, is tasked with assessing all real property in a community so that community can 
then, based on local property tax rates, properly collect property taxes owed by its 
residents.  Because the amount of taxes owed is largely a factor of the value of assessed 
property, a PVA has the great responsibility of determining the correct worth of that 
property.   
 In Kentucky, real property is to be assessed at 100 percent of its fair market value 
by an elected PVA.  The most current Kentucky Constitution, adopted in 1891, states 
that, “All property, not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be assessed for 
taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary 
sale.”  According to the Jefferson County PVA website, “fair cash value” and “market 
value” are to be considered synonymous.  Further, the International Association of 
Assessing Officers (IAAO) in Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration states 
that market value is the price a property would sell for in a competitive and open market. 
 The fair assessment of property in communities is a necessary function of local 
government.  Indeed, the public policy problem surrounding this issue is that an incorrect 
assessment of residential property negatively impacts communities that depend on 
accurate assessments in order to collect property taxes necessary for the county to 
provide goods and services for its citizens.  Should an assessor value property more than 
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its fair market value, residents may seek out other communities in which to live in order 
to escape what they perceive to be unfair taxes.  Should an assessor value property less 
than its fair market value—and forget for a moment that this is against the law—a 
community loses out on needed tax revenue.  Of course, a community might compensate 
this potential loss of revenue due to under-assessments by raising tax rates, but raising 
taxes is an often unpopular move.  One might theorize that property assessments are 
undervalued precisely to avoid paying higher taxes.   
 It should be noted that for the purposes of this paper, the terms “assessor” and 
“PVA” are synonymous.  In Kentucky, the PVA is the chief elected official in each 
county responsible for assessing property.  However, depending on the size of the PVA 
office there may be other non-elected assessors employed by the PVA who assess 
property in the county.  The term “appraiser” refers to an individual who is hired to 
conduct an official appraisal—often at the request of a homeowner—for determining the 
value of a home.  “Appraiser” and “assessor” are not synonymous.   
Kentucky has had a property tax since 1792 and though it is an often unpopular 
tax Kentucky voters have yet to demand measures such as those passed in California and 
Massachusetts that would either cap property assessments at a certain percentage or cap 
the percentage amount by which property taxes can be increased. Property tax revenue 
remains an important source of revenue for counties.   According to the Department of 
Finance for Lexington-Fayette County, revenue from property taxes exceeded $44 
million dollars in FY 2006.  This revenue was used to support services provided by 
LexTran (Lexington’s public transit authority), garbage collection, street cleaning, the 
health department, and especially the public school system.  Under the Kentucky 
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Education Reform Act, state funding of local school districts is, in part, determined by 
property assessments.  The Support Education Excellence in Kentucky funding formula 
uses the value of property assessment in counties as a variable in determining how much 
funding the state will provide to each district.  In short, districts with lower assessed 
property values are eligible to receive more state funding than districts with higher 
assessed property values.  Accurate property assessments ensure that districts throughout 
the state receive the funding from the state that they deserve.   
The assessment process is not an exact science; though property is supposed to be 
valued at fair market value, determining that value is, at times, quite difficult.  After all, 
how does one determine the value of a home that has not been “on the market” in many 
years?  How should an assessor determine the value of a home for which the value is not 
easily determined?  An econometric interpretation of this question is: how much 
measurement error exists in assessments?  This paper estimates the measurement error 
below.   
 There are three approaches one might use when assessing the value of a home—
the cost approach, the income approach, or the market comparison approach.  The cost 
approach involves determining what it would cost a homeowner to rebuild from scratch, 
i.e. replacement cost.  The income approach uses rental income data to value the home; 
how much an owner could receive in rent is the basis for determining the home’s worth.  
The most common approach, the market comparison approach, involves the use of known 
market values for similar properties to determine the value of the property being assessed.  
However, assessors do not use one approach—assessments typically involve the use of 
some combination in an effort to accurately value a home.  Properties are assessed based 
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on the value of similar properties in the area, the price per square foot builders charge for 
home construction, and the value of external improvements to the property and/or land.   
 The process by which an appraiser values a home is very similar to the process 
used by a county property assessor.  However, there is one key difference in the two 
processes: though an assessor is not explicitly forbidden from entering a home, Kentucky 
law is silent on whether an assessor has permission to inspect a home from the inside.  
Thus, any improvements in the house such as a finished basement or attic would not be 
captured by a property assessment but would be included in a report from an appraiser 
who was allowed to enter and inspect the inside of a home.  This difference is important 
in understanding the research question to be discussed.  If the greater information 
available to appraisers is useful, then the measurement error in appraised values is less 
than the measurement error in assessed values. 
Research Question: 
 Correct assessments of residential property—as discussed previously—are a 
necessary condition for determining the property taxes owed to a community by its 
residents.  The purpose of this paper is to ask, “Are Property Valuation Administrators 
correctly assessing residential property in counties throughout Kentucky?”  Additionally, 
is the difference between assessed value and appraised value consistent throughout the 
state or are certain communities more at risk for assessment inequities?  Are assessors 
systematically under-assessing homes in their communities or is the difference between 
assessed and market values essentially random variation?   
 To evaluate the accuracy of assessment, a “gold standard” is needed.  A candidate 
for this is the appraised value of a home.  To examine the accuracy of this assumption, 
two approaches are used in this paper.  The appraised value of a home in this data set is 
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not necessarily the fair market value of the property.  Other factors, not measured in the 
appraisal such as school districts, proximity to parks and greenspaces, help to determine 
the market value of a home.  These exogenous features may or may not be captured in an 
appraisal or in an assessment.  To examine the appraised value, three comparable 
properties valued by the market are associated with each property in the sample.  If the 
appraised value is an unbiased measure of market value, there should be a precise 
relationship between appraised value and market value of comparable property.  
Specifically, the market value should be predicted with the correct average subject to 
random variation.  This is tested below.  Second, the variation in market values of 
comparable properties is a measure of the uncertainty, or technically measurement error, 
of the appraised value.  This can be used to estimate any impact of measurement error on 
the statistical estimation. 
 Even if the appraised value of a home does not represent the full fair market 
value, it is a better indicator of the market than the assessed value for two reasons—
because local governments indicate that this is their belief and because there are 
difficulties with assessing property at 100 percent of fair market value.  Through my 
work as a research assistant with the Hazard Mitigation Grant Project, I have encountered 
many grant applications for FEMA-sponsored home acquisition projects from local 
communities where a “multiplier” has been added by the community onto the official 
PVA assessment in order to arrive at the fair market value (see Appendix 1).  In effect, 
these communities are indicating by their actions that their local PVA is not assessing 
property at 100 percent of the fair market value, as required by law.   
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But it is possible that it is quite difficult for a county PVA to accurately assess 
properties at the legally required limit.  Fair and accurate assessments depend on a full 
range of market data.  After all, if an assessor is using the market comparison approach 
and there is no market to compare the home to, how can an assessor know the fair value 
of a home?  And, as one PVA admitted, “In the end, you don’t know the market value of 
a home until it’s sold.”  This implies that assessments could not be perfect but does not 
imply that they must be under-assessed. 
 Besides the current Kentucky State Constitution, Kentucky Revised Statute 
132.690 requires that each property parcel be assessed annually—at fair market value—
and visually inspected at least once within a 4 year period.  But in 1965, the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals found that on average real property in the state was being assessed 
between 12.5 percent and 33 percent of its fair market value and ruled that in accordance 
with the State Constitution, real property must be assessed at 100 percent of the fair 
market value.  The Court found, “It is not only admitted but has become a matter of 
common knowledge that real estate and tangible personal property in Kentucky are 
assessed for tax purposes at varying percentages substantially less than 100 percent of 
fair cash value” (Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W. 2d 694; 1965).  It is probable that 
homeowners throughout the state are aware of past under-assessments.  Bringing these 
assessments up to fair market value would then, be quite difficult.  Any unexpected 
increase in an assessment could possibly create voter unrest and assessment appeals.  
Essentially, the entrenched system of under-assessment is the known problem with 
assessing at 100 percent of fair market value. 
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 Again, the purpose of this paper is to analyze property assessments from homes 
throughout the Commonwealth and compare those assessments to appraisals for those 
homes in order to determine if real property is being under-assessed throughout the 
Commonwealth and if so, by how much.  In addition, appraisals are compared to market 
values to provide evidence of whether appraisals are sufficiently accurate to be used as a 
standard. 
 
Unit of Analysis: 
 The units of analysis for the purposes of this study are individual residential 
properties across Kentucky.  Specifically, the properties in the data set are homes that 
have sustained flood damage or are at high-risk for sustaining flood damage and have 
either been acquired by the communities in which they are located using FEMA funds or 
have been identified as possible acquisition projects using FEMA funds in the future.  
When applying for mitigation funds from FEMA for acquisition projects, communities 
are required to submit proposed budgets, which include the estimated cost for purchasing 
the properties in the project from the homeowners.  To derive this estimated cost, 
applicants generally submit the most current PVA assessment for the property.  When a 
project is approved and funds are to be dispersed, FEMA requires that the applicant 
conduct an official appraisal—using a licensed appraiser—before purchasing the 
property.  It is this appraised value, and not the assessed value, that FEMA uses as the 
offer price to homeowners.  The data set consists of 199 properties targeted for 
acquisition between 1997 and 2005.  The data sets include homes of various size, age, 
and value that are from urban, suburban, and rural areas.   Although not every county is 
represented in the data set, all regions of the state are represented.  It is possible that the 
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sample of homes in floodplains identified as a target for acquisition and demolition 
differs from homes in Kentucky otherwise, but such a difference would have to affect the 
relationship between assessor and appraiser behavior to affect this research.   
 
Methodology: 
 The simplest statistical test to determine if the appraised values for the homes in 
the data set are significantly different than the assessed value is to conduct a group means 
comparison test.  In this test, Ho is that the difference of means is zero, meaning that there 
is no difference between the means of the two groups.  However, little analysis can be 
gained from this statistical test.  Regression analyses are conducted using the appraised 
values and assessed values of the homes.  In these regressions, other characteristics of the 
properties will be controlled to determine not only how the assessments differ from the 
appraisals but how they differ across areas of the state.  Additionally, because certain 
characteristics of the homes are used to determine the value of that home a hedonic price 
model will be constructed using those characteristics of the properties cited by property 
assessors as important characteristics in their assessments.   
 To examine the validity of the appraised value as a measure of market value as 
mandated by the constitution, a regression is estimated to test whether appraised value is 
an unbiased estimator of the average market value of three comparable properties.  To 
estimate the measurement error of appraised value, the variance of the three market 
values is calculated, subject to the hypothesis of unbiased estimation not being rejected. 
 All statistical tests are performed using Stata, Version 9.0 
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Literature Review: 
 Previous research on this issue has tended to focus on three main areas: the 
quality of assessments, the need for frequent assessments, and the quality and 
professionalism of assessors. 
 Gillen (2002) has commented on the need for quality assessments, noting that 
because the housing market is not as liquid as other markets it is difficult to observe 
actual market values.  But, although the process is not an exact science, the goal of 
property assessors should be to avoid any systematic errors in assessments.  As Strauss 
and Strauss (2003) note, “Where there is uniformity in assessments, our confidence in the 
tax collection process increases.  Many would likely be willing to pay a bit more tax if 
they knew that greater uniformity in administration of the local real estate tax would 
result” (2).  It could be argued that the inequity—vertical and horizontal—present in the 
property assessment process is responsible for the unpopularity of the property tax.  After 
all, a homeowner is more likely to have negative views of the property tax if he believes 
that he has been assessed more than his neighbor who has a similar home.  There is much 
debate as to whether the property tax is progressive (meaning that those with higher 
incomes pay more tax), regressive (those with lower incomes pay more tax), or 
proportional (all income levels pay the same percentage of their income).  Demusaj 
(2003) notes, “Despite the fact that the property tax is a major source of revenue for 
many localities, ubiquitous and unequivocal consensus does not exist on the issue of 
whether property taxes are progressive, regressive, or proportional” (6).  Though the 
debate is yet unsettled regarding the equity of the property tax in theory, inaccurate 
assessments tend to create a tax system that is skewed regressively.  Gillen (2002), 
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Mikesell (1978), and Engle (1975) all point out that inaccuracies in the assessment 
process tend to create a property tax system that is regressive.  Engle’s (1975) argument 
for a de facto regressive property tax is that lower-income neighborhoods tend to have 
slow rates of increase in property values and that property assessments rarely change.  
But, another argument for a de facto regressive property tax can be made.  Those with 
higher incomes are likely more aware of the value of not only their home but of the value 
of their neighbors’ homes as well.  Any perceived inaccuracy in a property assessment is 
almost certain to bring about an appeal, a process that for the assessor’s office is both 
costly and time consuming, as mentioned by Gillen (2002).   
 But improprieties in the assessment—at least deliberate improprieties—may not 
solely be responsible for a regressive tax system.  It is possible, as shown by McMillen 
and Weber (2006) that thin property markets may be at fault.  They write, “In a slow 
market with few sales, relevant information cannot be incorporated quickly into either a 
property’s market price or, by association, its assessed valuation” (3).  McMillen and 
Weber (2006) conclude that it is strongly suggestive that thick property markets are 
associated with more accurate property assessments. 
 The frequency of property assessments is important when discussing the 
perceived fairness of the property tax system.  As noted above, if assessments are 
infrequent and unchanging, those with rising property values pay proportionally less than 
do those living in neighborhoods with stagnant property values.  But infrequent 
assessments also benefit infrequent movers.  As stated by Strumpf (1999), “Assessed 
values, as well as property tax payments, are inversely proportional to home tenure” 
(170).  Besides vertical and horizontal inequity, infrequent assessments also distort the 
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socially optimum tax level.  Strumpf (1999) notes that long lags between property 
assessments lead to lower tax revenue for a community, which can only be recovered 
either by reassessments or a higher tax rate.  Stine (2005) theorizes that rational local 
governments shorten this lag time between reassessments in order to generate more 
revenue with a lower mill rate.  This is especially important in states with caps on 
property tax rates, such as California and Massachusetts.  Stine writes, “property tax 
limits are intended to restrict local governments from raising local tax rates.  However, 
the evidence from this study showed they [tax limits] were avoided…by increasing the 
assessment ration which usually was substantially below its legal limit” (2404).  
Kentucky statute requires an annual assessment, with an on-site inspection (which could 
be termed a reassessment) at least once within a four year period.   
 The accuracy of an assessment depends on two factors: the frequency by which 
that assessment is done and the professionalism and quality of the assessor.  As Borland 
(1990) writes, the degree of inequity is related to “assessing procedures, neighborhood 
characteristics, characteristics of the assessor and difficulty of the task, the frequency of 
reassessments, and more recently, to the property tax rate itself” (431, emphasis added).  
It is often believed, as Bowman and Mikesell (1989) note, that the property assessment 
process is inherently flawed because assessors are elected rather than appointed.  
However, they find that in Virginia—a state that has both elected and appointed 
assessors—the quality of assessments does not depend on the method by which the 
assessor is selected.  Strauss and Sullivan (1998) state that communities ought to replace 
appointed assessors with elected assessors if they are seeking to improve the quality of 
assessments.  This may be surprising to some who believe that elected assessors have a 
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political interest in under-assessing property in their jurisdiction.  Further, county 
assessors do a much better job than do local (i.e., city or town) assessors.  Though no 
reason is given in the literature as to why this is true, one could suggest that a local 
assessor can be too involved in the day-to-day happenings of his neighbors, whereas a 
county assessor can be insulated politically.  If, then, appointing assessors rather than 
electing them does not improve the quality of property assessments, what can be done to 
improve the quality of assessors and subsequently the quality of assessments?  Bowman 
and Mikesell (1989) argue for contracting assessor services—presumably with certified 
appraisers, though they do not specify.  They write, “Contracting appears empirically as 
well as logically, to provide professionalization’s benefits without the local assessor’s 
office being staffed by person meeting the usual professionalism standards” (186).  
Additionally, the state has a role to play.  Strauss and Sullivan (1998) argue that state 
establishment and enforcement of assessment standards is necessary, which includes 
assessor standards.  Further, prohibiting “right of entry” is related to lower quality 
assessments.  As noted before, Kentucky statute is silent on this issue. 
 
Analysis of Data: 
 A group means comparison test indicates that the mean for assessed value and the 
mean for appraised value are statistically different.  In the data set, the mean for assessed 
value is $40,907 while the mean for appraised value is $58,901.  As shown in Table 1, 
with a t-value of -5.41, the null hypothesis that the means are not different can be 
rejected.  This is significant at the .01 level.  This reveals only that the mean values of the 
data set are statistically significantly different.  From that, we can state that the assessed 
value and the appraised value are different.   
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Table 1 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
 
Variable                Obs             Mean         Std. Err.           Std. Dev.                  [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
assedvalue           199             40906.63     2116.047       29850.51                36733.75    45079.51 
appedvalue          199              58901.01    2562.828       36153.13                53847.06    63954.95 
 
combined             398             49903.82    1719.995        34313.79                 46522.38    53285.25  
 
diff                     -17994.38      3323.513                                                         -24528.31   -11460.44 
 
diff = mean(assedvalue) - mean(appedvalue)                    t =  -5.4143 
               Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      396 
 
Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
 
A test of unbiased prediction of a variable y, such as assessed value, by a variable 
x, such as appraised value, is carried out by regressing y on x with a constant term and 
testing the joint hypothesis that the constant is 0 and the slope 1, i.e. that y = 0 + 1x + 
random variation, represented as an error term ε.  The slope of unity would assure that y 
is just x with random noise, and the constant of 0 would assure that the level is not 
adjusted absolutely up or down.  An F-test is used for this joint hypothesis test.  The F-
statistic is highly statistically significant.  Below, this idea is used again to examine 
whether appraised values provide unbiased estimates of market values. 
 What happens if assessed value is regressed onto appraised value?  If—and we 
know this is not the situation because of the group means comparison test conducted 
previously—assessed value and appraised value were not statistically different, then the 
coefficient for appraised value would be 1, indicating that the assessed value was 100 
percent of the appraised value.  Instead, this regression reveals a coefficient of .7558, 
meaning that the assessed value is 75 percent of the appraised value.  In other words, if 
the appraised value is a proxy for the full fair market value, then assessors are under-
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valuing homes by 25 percent in the data set.  In addition, the estimated constant of -3612 
indicates that assessed values are also adjusted absolutely downward.  The hypothesis of 
unbiased assessment is rejected with very large F statistic (p<0.0001).  Table 2 shows the 
Stata output for this regression with relevant R2, t-values, and F-values.  
Table 2  
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε 
 
Source           SS                 df                   MS                                             Number of obs =     199 
                                                                                                                       F(  1,   197) = 1018.84 
Model           1.4784e+11     1                 1.4784e+11                                     Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual       2.8586e+10   197               145107824                                    R-squared     =  0.8380 
                                                                                                                    Adj R-squared =  0.8372
Total             1.7643e+11   198                891053108                                  Root MSE      =   12046 
 
 
assedvalue                Coef.                  Std. Err.             t          P>|t|                  [95% Conf. Interval] 
appedvalue              .7558242            .0236792       31.92      0.000               .7091269    .8025214 
cons                         -3612.175           1635.375       -2.21      0.028              -6837.264   -387.0858 
This regression can be expanded further, controlling for both urban and rural 
areas.  Rural areas are defined as cities with populations less than 20,000, while urban 
areas are considered cities with populations greater than 20,000.  In this regression, the 
coefficient for appraised value becomes .7570.  Again, urban areas in the data set assess 
their properties at 75 percent of the fair market value.  However, rural areas do not do so 
well in assessing properties at their market value.  When only rural properties are 
regressed, the coefficient for appraised value is .6987; rural PVAs assess properties 
approximately 30 percent below their fair market value.  Tables 3 and 4 show the relevant 
Stata output.  The constant terms are statistically insignificant in these regressions, 
indicating the statistically significant constant in the combined regression could have 
resulted from combining the samples, not from appraiser practice.  Both urban and rural 
assessors appear to scale down appraised values, but at different average rates. 
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Table 3 
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε if urban =1 
 
Source                  SS             df          MS                                                     Number of obs =      87 
                                                                                                                         F(  1,    85) =  503.11 
Model                7.7622e+10    1        7.7622e+10                                          Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual|          1.3114e+10    85      154286645                                          R-squared     =  0.8555 
                                                                                                                    Adj R-squared =  0.8538 
Total                 9.0737e+10   86        1.0551e+09                                       Root MSE      =   12421 
 
 
assedvalue            Coef.         Std. Err.          t          P>|t|                                  [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
appedvalue          .7569824   .0337486      22.43       0.000                            .6898811    .8240837 
cons                     -2428.157   2944.878     -0.82        0.412                           -8283.362    3427.049 
 
 
Table 4 
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε if urban =0 
 
Source                   SS               df               MS                                            Number of obs =     112 
                                                                                                                        F(  1,   110) =  243.30 
Model                 3.3174e+10     1           3.3174e+10                                     Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual            1.4999e+10   110          136351710                                    R-squared     =  0.6886 
                                                                                                                    Adj R-squared =  0.6858 
Total                 4.8173e+10   111           433987717                                   Root MSE      =   11677 
 
 
assedvalue               Coef.              Std. Err.        t            P>|t|                          [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
appedvalue           .698664            .044792     15.60        0.000                      .6098968    .7874311 
cons                     -2075.494        2266.472      -0.92       0.362                      -6567.109    2416.121 
 
 
In the above tests, urban areas and rural areas were analyzed separately.  Similar 
conclusions can be reached by using all observations and including a dummy variable 
“urban” along with an interaction variable uapped (urban times appraised value). The 
variable “urban” is a dummy variable with “1” representing an urban location and “0” 
representing a rural location.  The interaction variable represents appraisals in urban 
areas.  In the regression model, we have y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + ε, where x1 = the 
appraised value of the home, x2 = the dummy variable “urban” with “urban” =1 if in an 
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urban location, and x3 = the interaction variable “uapped” indicating the appraisal of a 
home in an urban area.  Table 5 contains the relevant Stata output for this model.  In the 
model, we have significant coefficients on the variables “appedvalue” and “uapped.”  
Those coefficients are .6469 and .1101, respectively, indicating that a home is assessed at 
approximately 65 percent of its fair market value with an urban assessment being worth 
an additional 11 percent.  This is similar to what was found earlier using only urban areas 
in the regression; in that model, the estimated coefficient was .7570.  Again, urban 
assessments are much closer to revealing the true fair market value of a home than are 
assessments conducted in rural areas of the Commonwealth. 
Table 5 
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + ε 
 
Source               SS                df                  MS                                            Number of obs =     199 
                                                                                                                        F(  3,   197) =  371.18 
Model          1.5259e+11        3              5.0862e+10                                      Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual     2.6995e+10       197           137029576                                      R-squared     =  0.8497 
                                                                                                                    Adj R-squared =  0.8474 
Total           1.7958e+11       200           897909505                                     Root MSE      =   11706 
 
 
assedvalue              Coef.          Std. Err.          t           P>|t|                              [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
appedvalue        .6468708       .0400143       16.17      0.000                          .5679595    .7257821 
urban                -2081.429      3471.045        -0.60      0.549                          -8926.605    4763.747 
uapped             .1101115       .0511147         2.15       0.032                           .0093092    .2109139 
cons                 -346.7279      2084.672        -0.17       0.868                           -4457.865     3764.41 
 
 
Assessors—and appraisers—indicate that certain characteristics of the home are 
important when estimating the market value of a home.  Indeed, as previously mentioned, 
characteristics such as the size of the home (as measured by square feet), the number of 
bathrooms and bedrooms, and the age of the home are the primary characteristics 
analyzed when determining a home’s worth.  Thus, we can estimate the value of the 
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properties in the data set using a hedonic price model and regressing assessed value on 
those characteristics known to be important to property assessors.  The model becomes   
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β4x4 + ε, with x1 = the variable “sqft” representing the 
size of the house measure by square feet; x2 = the variable “bedrooms” representing the 
number of bedrooms in the home; x3 = the variable “bathrooms” indicating the number of 
bathrooms in the home; and x4 = the variable “age” for the age of the home.  The “y” 
variable is assessed value.  The model indicates that of those four variables, only 
bedrooms in not a significant coefficient.  Table 6 details the relevant Stata output.  As 
we can see, on average each additional square foot of living space adds an additional 
$17.53 to the value of a home.  Further, each additional bathroom is worth an additional 
$11,197.  That this variable is statistically significant and the variable “bedrooms” is not 
statistically significant is not surprising.  The coefficient for “age” is negative, which is 
also not surprising.  Though there may be value in historic neighborhoods and older 
homes, there is the possibility that older homes are in stagnant and deteriorating 
neighborhoods, which would lower the value of the home. 
Table 6 
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + ε 
 
Source            SS            df            MS                                                         Number of obs =     199 
                                                                                                                         F(  4,   194) =   13.81 
Model       3.9094e+10     4         9.7735e+09                                                 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual   1.3733e+11   194       707910066                                                R-squared     =  0.2216 
                                                                                                                    Adj R-squared =  0.2055 
Total         1.7643e+11   198       891053108                                               Root MSE      =   26607 
 
 
assedvalue           Coef.         Std. Err.          t         P>|t|                                    [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
sqft                   17.53325       6.475086       2.71      0.007                              4.762645    30.30385 
bedrooms         2068.238      2921.197        0.71      0.480                              -3693.143     7829.62 
bathrooms        11196.52      5113.417        2.19      0.030                              1111.491    21281.55 
age                  -274.9943     106.1173        -2.59      0.010                              -484.286   -65.70249 
cons                 9241.42        8811.886         1.05      0.296                            -8137.976    26620.82 
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  The hedonic model estimates what determines the market value of a house.  
Inserting into the same hedonic model the variable appedvalue (appraised value) tests a 
different hypothesis.  If assessed values are scaled versions of appraised values, then 
conditional on appraised value, characteristics of homes should not matter.  If assessors, 
in contrast, value specific features of homes differently from the market, then those 
features predict differences between assessed and appraised values.  If the coefficient for 
appraised value is not capturing assessor behavior toward those home characteristics, 
then the coefficients for “sqft”, “bedrooms”, “bathrooms”, and “age” should remain 
significant.  As shown in Table 7, when regressing assessed value onto the home 
characteristic variables and the appraised value of the home, the only coefficient that is 
significant is the one associated with the appraised value of the home; the others are 
individually and jointly statistically insignificant.  This implies that assessors scale down 
the market value on average without adjusting for specific characteristics. 
Table 7 
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + β4x4 + ε 
 
Source                   SS                    df                    MS                                  Number of obs =     199 
                                                                                                                        F(  5,   193) =  202.11 
Model               1.4814e+11           5                 2.9627e+10                           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual           2.8292e+10         193              146588429                           R-squared     =  0.8396 
                                                                                                                    Adj R-squared =  0.8355 
Total                 1.7643e+11         198              891053108                          Root MSE      =   12107 
 
 
assedvalue            Coef.            Std. Err.           t           P>|t|                             [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
sqft                      -.4178954      3.019115       -0.14      0.890                         -6.372591    5.536801
bedrooms             386.0561      1330.726        0.29      0.772                         -2238.577    3010.689 
bathrooms            -1277.407     2371.391       -0.54      0.591                        -5954.577    3399.763 
age                        58.92013     49.81672        1.18      0.238                         -39.33497    157.1752 
appedvalue           .7709786     .0282679       27.27      0.000                           .715225    .8267323 
cons                     -5683.476     4047.031       -1.40      0.162                         -13665.56    2298.612 
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 We can expand these models further by including dummy variables for the 
different foundations of the homes in the data set—poured concrete, mobile home, or 
another foundation type.  Adding the dummy variables for foundation types does not 
change the significance of the other variables—size of the home, age, and number of 
bathroom remain statistically significant.  However, only “mobile” is significant of the 
foundation-type variables.  A mobile home reduces the hedonic value of a property 
assessment by approximately $33,632.42.  However, there is no change to the conclusion 
that assessors scale down the market value with no reference to specific characteristics, 
including foundation and mobile home. 
 All of this presumes that appraised value is in fact a valid measure of fair market 
value.  If it is not, none of the conclusions are useful, and if it is measured with error, 
then the coefficients on it are biased toward zero, biasing such estimates as the 75 percent 
ratio of assessed to appraised value toward zero, making interpretation of assessor 
behavior impossible.   
 To evaluate the appraised value directly, the average market value of three 
comparable properties is regressed on appraised value.  This expected value model is 
similar to the one above where assessed value was regressed on appraised value.  As 
before, a constant of zero and a slope of unity subject to sampling error is the relevant 
joint hypothesis.  Table 8 shows the relevant Stata output.  The estimates show a constant 
of 2337 (t-value of 0.72) and a slope of 0.9825 (standard error of 0.0472), both 
individually and jointly insignificantly different from the hypothetical values (p<0.69).  
So the appraised value appears to be an unbiased estimator of the market value of 
comparable properties. 
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Table 8 
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε 
 
Source               SS            df             MS                                                     Number of obs =     199 
                                                                                                                        F(  1,   197) =  433.25 
Model          2.4981e+11     1       2.4981e+11                                                Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual      1.1359e+11   197      576605081                                              R-squared     =  0.6874 
                                                                                                                    Adj R-squared =  0.6858 
Total            3.6340e+11   198     1.8354e+09                                             Root MSE      =   24013 
 
 
avgappval              Coef.                 Std. Err.              t            P>|t|                    [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
appedvalue        .9824927              .047202         20.81         0.000                .8894066    1.075579 
cons                  2337.457             3259.952           0.72         0.474                -4091.426     8766.34 
 
It is still possible that there could be measurement error, but that can be measured 
directly using the three comparable properties.  The standard deviation of appraised 
values is 36153.  The average standard deviation of measurement error across these 199 
properties is 6897, less than one fifth of 36153.  The variance of measurement error is the 
square of the ratio of standard deviations, 3.5 percent of the variance of appraised values.  
This implies that the downward bias in regression-estimated relationship between 
assessed and appraised values is similar, 3.5 percent.  For example, a coefficient of 0.7 
might have been 0.7245 (i.e. 0.7 times 1.035) without any measurement error.  Such a 
small measurement error changes no qualitative conclusions or comparisons in this paper.  
Appraised value is an appropriate standard against which to compare assessed value.   
 
 
Conclusion: 
 Based on the data set available, it appears as though property assessors throughout 
Kentucky are under-assessing residential property, on average, by approximately 25 
percent.  The Kentucky State Constitution, as well as KRS 132.690 explicitly state that 
all real property must be assessed at 100 percent of its fair market value, which in this 
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data set is represented by the appraisal value.  Various econometric tests confirm that this 
value is, indeed, a good measure of the fair market value.  Therefore, the properties in the 
data set—at the time of their assessment—were not assessed at their full fair market 
value, in violation of the law.  Additionally, econometrical testing indicates that 
properties in rural areas are assessed at a much lower rate (69 percent of fair market 
value) than the entire data set while urban properties are assessed at a higher rate 
(approximately 78 percent of fair market value).   
 Based on available evidence, it also appears as though the assessors in this data 
set are aware of the fair market value and are scaling back the assessments, as indicated 
by a hedonic price model constructed with relevant property characteristics used by 
property assessors to assess residential property.   
It is possible to theorize why the data indicates the results above.  First, it is 
important to note that property assessment is not an exact science, especially in thin 
markets with little available comparison data.  This is a possible explanation for the 
difference is assessment quality between rural and urban areas.  But assessor quality is 
also a potential factor.  It is the belief of at least one Kentucky PVA that many PVAs 
throughout the state are not qualified and lack the necessary skills to accurately value 
properties.  Whether this is true or not is not known, but it is probable that PVA offices in 
more populated areas have larger staffs and budgets.  If money, or a lack thereof, is 
correlated with assessment quality it is likely that this perception is only seemingly true 
because larger offices can afford better training for the assessors.  One possible solution 
that has potential for success is to supplement PVA assessments with private appraisals, 
an approach argued by Bowman and Mikesell (1989).  This could help alleviate the 
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difficulty with not only thin markets but may increase the perception of professionalism 
in some PVA offices.  It should be noted that because not all Kentucky counties are 
represented in this data set and because this data set includes properties which may or 
may not be representative of the housing population throughout the Commonwealth, 
more study is indeed needed on this issue. 
It is, however, troubling that the data does indicate some assessor knowledge of 
the full fair market value.  It makes one wonder if assessors are not scaling back 
assessments in order to avoid the costly and time consuming appeals process, seemingly 
knowing that assessing at 75 percent of market value is the limit beyond which property 
owners are more likely to appeal.  It is also possible, though great care has been taken to 
avoid much discussion of politics in this study, that assessors are worried about their re-
electability.  Kentucky PVAs are elected in each county; it is within the realm of 
possibility that under-assessment occurs not only to avoid the costly appeals process but 
that by avoiding the appeals process the electorate is not dissatisfied with the job 
performance of the PVA.  However, it is difficult to know how much, if any, politics 
influences the property assessment process.  Again, more study of this issue is necessary. 
Inaccurate property assessments can distort the property tax system, creating 
inequities both horizontally and vertically.  Horizontal inequity is created if two similar 
properties are assessed at a different value.  Vertical inequity is created if the assessments 
are under-assessed more for higher income properties than for lower income properties.  
A property tax system that is perceived as being fair and equitable is necessary for the 
function of local governments.  A property assessment process that values properties at 
their full fair market value is the basis for this property tax system.  Though current 
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evidence indicates that assessors are not valuing property at 100 percent of their fair 
market value, as required by law, is it important to mention that in 1965 the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals found that properties were, on average, being assessed between 12.5 
percent and 33 percent of their fair market value.  Though the evidence indicates that 
assessment quality is improving, there also remains room for further improvement. 
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Appendix 1: 
Proposed budget submitted by Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government for a 
FEMA grant project in 1998 to buy floodprone homes.  Note the columns indicating PVA 
assessment value and the 20 percent multiplier to bring the value up to fair market value.
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